Thailand’s Cycle of Coups: Is History Doomed to Repeat Itself?
It’s a familiar dread, distilled through decades of Thai history. The chants rise, the rhetoric sharpens, and the insidious suggestion of a “necessary intervention” begins to circulate, cloaked in the language of national salvation. The more things appear to change in Thailand, the more one wonders if they are simply trapped in a deterministic loop. The latest iteration features calls for Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s resignation, amplified by a leaked audio clip and anxieties about her administration’s policies. As the Bangkok Post reports, protest groups are already denying coup aspirations while simultaneously concentrating supporters at strategic locations. But the very performance of denial carries its own telling weight.
These accusations, leveled by various factions, including the Pheu Thai Party and the People’s Party, underscore a persistent, palpable fear: Thailand’s deeply entrenched history of military interventions. Twelve successful coups since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932—a figure made all the more stark when considering the relative rarity of such events in other democracies of comparable age. And the 2014 coup that ousted Yingluck Shinawatra, Paetongtarn’s aunt, remains a raw reminder of the military’s enduring shadow. But to focus merely on the threat of military action is to miss the puppeteer for the puppet.
“Do not bring in those generals [to govern]. Let people like us in [the government],” said Sondhi, a core leader of the yellow-shirt movement that shut down Bangkok’s two airports in 2008.
But focusing on personalities and surface-level grievances obscures the deeper, more intractable problem. Thailand’s chronic political instability is not merely a consequence of bad actors or policy disagreements, though those undoubtedly play a role. It is instead, a symptom of a profoundly unbalanced and perpetually contested political settlement, one where competing power centers operate within a system rigged to thwart genuinely popular governance. The military, the monarchy, powerful business conglomerates, and deeply entrenched political factions are locked in a constant, zero-sum struggle. And fueling this conflict is a critical, often overlooked component: a judiciary readily weaponized to delegitimize political opponents.
Consider it a self-perpetuating cycle, a negative feedback loop built into the very foundations of the system. Democratically elected governments, often (though not always) aligned with the Shinawatra family, pursue policies designed to benefit their core constituencies, policies that inherently threaten the existing power structures. The established elite, feeling their privileges imperiled, then cry foul, often invoking accusations of corruption or perceived disrespect towards the monarchy. Social unrest inevitably ensues. The military, cloaked in the mantle of national savior, then steps in, promising stability but inevitably reinforcing the existing power structure and further eroding democratic institutions. Rinse, repeat.
As Duncan McCargo, a leading scholar of Thai politics, argued in his seminal work, “Tearing Apart the Land,” Thai politics has been characterized by an enduring struggle between a “network monarchy” and the aspirations of electoralism, a dynamic that consistently produces ruptures and challenges to the status quo. This tension is further exacerbated by the kingdom’s draconian lèse-majesté laws, which foster a climate of fear, suppress open debate, and effectively criminalize dissent. These laws, in turn, empower hardliners and stifle any meaningful reform efforts, creating a society where genuine political discourse is perpetually relegated to the shadows.
The current protests, spearheaded by groups like the United Power of the Land to Protect Sovereignty, are merely the latest manifestation of this underlying systemic instability. Their demands — including the prime minister’s resignation, the withdrawal of coalition partners, and the rejection of controversial government policies such as casino development — reflect a widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s trajectory. And their calls for a new, people-drafted constitution suggest a deeper yearning for a fundamental restructuring of the power dynamics that have plagued Thailand for far too long.
Ultimately, Thailand’s cyclical instability will persist indefinitely unless these deeply embedded structural issues are confronted head-on. Coups are not the underlying cause of the problem; they are merely a predictable effect of a system that remains fundamentally out of equilibrium, designed to protect entrenched interests at the expense of genuine democracy. And until a pathway toward a truly inclusive and representative political settlement is forged, one that meaningfully addresses the imbalances of power and allows for genuine political discourse, the script will continue to play out, with new actors, new grievances, but ultimately, the same old, tragic story.
