Thailand’s Politics: Self-Dealing Deals Undermine Democracy’s Promise Globally
The problem with politics, everywhere, isn’t just that it rarely looks like a straightforward pursuit of the common good. It’s that it actively disincentivizes it. The incentives almost always tilt towards coalition building, toward satisfying the demands of small, powerful factions, toward the kinds of messy compromises that make abstract ideals seem almost quaint. The news out of Thailand, where Bhumjaithai Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul is poised to become prime minister, epitomizes this deeply unsatisfying reality. He’s set to reclaim the interior minister post, Bangkok Post reports, securing support from the opposition People’s Party (PP) in a move that feels less like forging consensus and more like a pre-ordained auction.
What’s striking isn’t just the anticipated outcome, but the sheer opacity of the process. Pheu Thai’s candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, promised to dissolve parliament immediately if elected, accepting “all conditions set by the PP.” Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, leader of the PP, then dismissed this offer, accusing Pheu Thai of “inconsistency and insincerity in negotiations.” The idea that transparency, honesty, and integrity are central to democracy is clearly not upheld. The quiet part, unsaid but understood, is that these deals are often less about policy and more about access to power, resources, and the perks of office — the oxygen that keeps the political machine running.
I have no regrets in aligning with Bhumjaithai, pledging accountability if Mr Anutin fails to honour the deal.
The promised “accountability” is likely to be minimal. Thailand has seen this pattern before — governments rise and fall, constitutions are rewritten, and the cycle of political instability continues. But it’s not just a Thai problem; it’s a symptom of a deeper democratic malaise.
Thailand’s situation isn’t unique. It reflects a broader global trend towards democratic backsliding and the erosion of public trust in institutions. As political scientist Larry Diamond has argued, a key driver of this decline is the rise of “illiberal democracy,” where elections are held but basic rights and freedoms are not fully respected, and the rule of law is selectively applied. But what if the deeper problem isn’t just illiberal democracy, but the erosion of belief in democracy itself? When the process feels rigged, the outcome predetermined, and the politicians self-serving, it’s hard to sustain faith in the system, however well-intentioned its founding principles.
Thailand’s modern political history is punctuated by military coups, constitutional rewrites, and persistent tensions between traditional elites and those seeking greater democratization. The 2006 coup, for example, ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist prime minister accused of corruption and abuse of power, but whose policies also benefited the rural poor — a complexity often lost in the Western narrative. The 2014 coup, led by then-General Prayut Chan-o-cha, ousted an elected government. His subsequent tenure as prime minister saw a gradual erosion of democratic norms and increasing restrictions on dissent. It’s a history of interrupted progress, of fleeting moments of democratic promise followed by the familiar thud of authoritarian resurgence.
The current maneuverings are playing out against this backdrop, with familiar patterns of power consolidation and behind-the-scenes deal-making. Key ministries like Transport, Higher Education, and even the Prime Minister’s Office are expected to be parceled out among allied parties, reinforcing the perception of politics as a spoils system. This fuels public cynicism and undermines the legitimacy of the political process. Consider this: repeated polling in Thailand shows consistently low levels of trust in political parties and institutions, a direct consequence of this perceived self-dealing.
The promise of drafting a new constitution, touted by Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut as justification for the PP’s support of Mr. Anutin, is likely a palliative. New constitutions have been drafted before in Thailand, but have not always led to systemic change. As Samuel Huntington noted in his seminal work “Political Order in Changing Societies,” the key to political stability isn’t simply having institutions, but having institutions that are adaptable, legitimate, and deeply rooted in the culture. But Huntington also cautioned that rapid modernization, without corresponding institutional development, could lead to instability — a dynamic arguably playing out in Thailand.
Ultimately, the situation in Thailand underscores a fundamental tension within democratic systems. Can democracy thrive when political actors prioritize self-interest and short-term gains over the long-term health of the system? Or is the constant pursuit of power simply the price we pay for freedom, a necessary evil in the messy, imperfect business of governing? Perhaps the question isn’t whether this is the price of freedom, but whether, in Thailand, and increasingly elsewhere, that price is being paid by the wrong people, and for the wrong reasons. And whether, at some point, the bill becomes too high to bear.
