Bangkok Senate Fight Jeopardizes Yingluck’s Return
Thailand’s political landscape remains a complex and uncertain terrain, marked by maneuvering and speculation surrounding former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s potential return and a power struggle within the Senate. While rumors of her homecoming have circulated since her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, returned and received a commuted sentence last year, Dr. Warong Detkitvikrom, chairman of the Thai Pakdee Party and a staunch critic of Yingluck, believes such a return is unlikely.
Dr. Warong, known for his exposure of the controversial rice-pledging scheme under Yingluck’s administration, argues that Thaksin’s legal troubles have inadvertently hindered his sister’s prospects. Thaksin’s ongoing investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Commission regarding his hospital stay before parole, coupled with charges of lèse majesté and violations of the Computer Crime Act, creates a precarious precedent for Yingluck. Dr. Warong contends that any attempt to secure similar leniency for Yingluck would invite comparisons and fuel public discontent, particularly given her younger age and lack of documented serious illnesses.
The rice-pledging scheme, implemented between 2011 and 2014, continues to significantly impact Thai politics. The program, which purchased rice from farmers at inflated prices, resulted in substantial government losses and contributed to Yingluck’s conviction and subsequent exile in 2017. Recent attempts by the current Pheu Thai-led government to demonstrate the viability of remaining rice stocks have been dismissed by Dr. Warong as political posturing.
Meanwhile, a separate power struggle centers on the Senate and allegations of collusion during last year’s elections. The Department of Special Investigation (DSI), tasked with investigating these claims, recently postponed its decision on launching a formal probe, prompting speculation of behind-the-scenes negotiations. The allegations primarily target the “blue faction” senators, allegedly aligned with the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), the second-largest party in the governing coalition. Their considerable Senate influence grants the BJT significant leverage over legislative matters, including constitutional amendments.
Political analysts interpret the DSI’s delay as a strategic move to pressure the BJT and potentially shift the Senate’s political alignment. Stithorn Thananithichot, director of the Office of Innovation for Democracy at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, suggests that power brokers, including Thaksin and the BJT’s influential figure Newin Chidchob, are likely engaged in negotiations. He proposes a possible compromise involving senators resigning for health reasons or changing their voting allegiances, allowing reserve senators—some affiliated with Pheu Thai—to fill vacancies. This strategic reshuffling could bolster Pheu Thai’s influence within the Senate.
Further speculation points towards a potential ministerial reshuffle, with Pheu Thai possibly aiming to regain control of the influential Interior Ministry, currently held by BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul. Controlling this ministry, which oversees local administrative agencies, would significantly benefit Pheu Thai’s efforts to consolidate power before the next general election in 2027.
As these power plays unfold, Thailand’s political future remains uncertain. Yingluck Shinawatra’s potential return remains intertwined with her brother’s legal battles and the shifting political dynamics surrounding the Senate. The ongoing negotiations and potential reshuffles underscore the complex and often opaque nature of Thai politics—a high-stakes game of alliances, compromises, and shifting power dynamics.
